Walser's romantic nationalism and his less-than-romantic opposition of feeling and cognition may be troubling, but his reclamation of feeling and emotion resonates with recent phenomena (not only) in Geschichts-Deutschland. The double issue of Ästhetik und Kommunikation tracks the new feeling for history through interviews with historians and philosophers, suggestive photographs, and articles on literature, music, theater, and architecture. But the editors seem to have missed the obvious in taking stock of the renaissance of feeling in Germany: with a few exceptions, 2 there is nary a mention of the audiovisual media. This is all the more surprising as these media-both  lm and television-arguably take pride of place in the production of a diffuse but distinctly new feeling for history. From Berne, 2003) and Oliver Hirschbiegel's Der Untergang (Downfall, 2004) , the media have supplied a stream of historical representations characterized by strong affect and emotion.
Take the case of Das Wunder von Bern. When Wortmann's  lm about Germany's "miraculous" victory at the 1954 soccer World Cup premiered in October 2003, it was an immediate success. Recouping its unusually high production costs in the opening weekend alone, the  lm appeared to have hit a nerve with the German public. Or rather, it tapped an emotion. "Audiences came and cried buckets," wrote one reviewer; "even Chancellor Schröder supposedly shed a tear along with his sodden masses." 3 Indeed, Schröder freely confessed that he had "bawled"-and this after the  lm's director had already reported back proudly from a private preview screening, noting that the chancellor had in fact cried three times. Speaking candidly about his emotional reaction at the star-studded premiere in Essen (the  lm's working-class locale), Schröder urged his fellow German males to "loosen their macho inhibitions and join him." 4 In hindsight it looks as though Schröder's tears were as important a part of the event that was Das Wunder von Bern as the  lm itself. In this sense, the chancellor's well-publicized reaction transcended the emotional investment of a single viewer,  agging a broader currency of cinematic affect in post-Wall Germany. The object of that affect is German history; its preferred generic form, as signaled by the discourse on crying, is melodrama. The question raised by the event is the one that centrally concerns me here: what are the emotional logics that govern the intersection of historical representation with cinematic form?
The audiovisual production of a "feeling for history" takes place against the backdrop of a growing body of critical and scholarly texts that trace the vagaries of history, memory, and Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coping with the past) after uni cation. German cultural studies in recent years has pointed to new con gurations of perpetrators and victims in German culture, as memories of the war and the immediate postwar years have become infused with images of German suffering. 5 While I certainly join that diagnosis in the present essay, my goal is to reconnect the debate to an analysis of cultural forms. Focusing my inquiry on a central "text" in the shifting discourse on German history, I trace new forms of cathexis that are linked, in turn, to a profound shift in foundational narratives for postuni cation Germany. At a micro level, I investigate the specific textual forms in which the new Geschichtsgefühl is mediated. In other words, if the current popular "feeling for history" is overwhelmingly cinematic and televisual, then we need to link considerations of history and form and inquire into the speci c strategies that produce historical feeling as an audiovisual emotion. To speak of Geschichtsgefühl means not only to trace particular historical "constellations" of affect but also to ask how affect is "cued," "solicited," even "structured" in aesthetic texts. This happens not simply at the level of particular plots but, just as important, on the deeper levels of  lm form. This analysis demands a conceptual framework that takes into account the speci city of  lm as a medium for producing and negotiating affect. Fortunately, several scholars have been working on such frameworks in the wake of what some have described as an "emotional turn" in cinema studies. 6 Though far from uni ed, this scholarship provides ample leads for conceptualizing the affective force of audiovisual media in the contemporary German context.
On a macro level, the new forms of emotional address in  lms about German history index not only an ongoing transformation of German cinema after uni cation but also a profound generational shift. As the history of the Holocaust and the Third Reich recedes from collective into cultural memory and the witness generation dies out, the period's historical valence changes-as do the politics of representation. This has less to do with the ostensible overcoming of much-touted representational taboos (such as the representation of the Führer as a  ctional character or of the Holocaust in the mode of comedy) than with changing forms of cathexis, and of empathy in particular. If generations de ne themselves, among other things, through the emotional relationship to particular "generational objects," as Habbo Knoch has argued, then the shifting role of the Holocaust, Hitler, and Nazi Germany as such objects reveals a putative change of the generational guard, which we might think of as a shift from "1968" to "1989." While this shift may be traced across various realms of contemporary culture, 7 we should be wary of its totalizing claims, its largely oedipal logic: a generational transition of this kind-which, as Sigrid Weigel has pointed out, may be conceptualized much more precisely as a form of Verschachtelung (telescoping)-need not come at the expense of earlier insights, which end up displaced or repressed, at best. 8 In other words, even if we recognize the ineluctable shift from one regime of representation to the next, the overwriting of "1968" by "1989" in recent cultural production represents an ideological construct in need of careful scrutiny. We will have to evaluate what is gained but also what is lost with the emergence of cultural forms and representational politics that generate empathy with victimized Germans, if not with German perpetrators, only by violently repudiating earlier forms of historical representation and emotional cathexis.
Emotion Pictures
With its power to move mass audiences to tears or laughter, to make spectators shrink in horror or shiver with suspense, the cinema has long been recognized as a uniquely affective medium. Hugo Münsterberg insisted as early as 1916 that "to picture emotions must be the central aim of the photoplay."
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Münsterberg noted the actor's role in portraying emotions but was more concerned with the psychology of  lm form, relating the medium's properties to the spectator's mental operations. 10 Picking up Münsterberg's interest in  lm and psychology almost a century later, Ed Tan discusses cinema as an "emotion machine," arguing that "the awareness provided by a motion picture is an emotional one in the  rst place."
11 Like other  lm scholars of recent years, Tan investigates spectatorial response as a form of mental processing of audiovisual cues, albeit emotionally in ected. Arguing from a cognitivist perspective that has come around to recognize the role of emotions in cognition, scholars such as Tan, Murray Smith, Carl Plantinga, and Greg M. Smith have studied the complex mechanisms behind the production of cinematic emotion; their ever-more-nuanced investigations of different types of emotion, of the interplay among emotional "elicitors" and "conditioners" or of the relation between "mood" and emotional arousal, have helped us understand the emotional effects of  lm form-what we might call the "affect" of form-at a high level of speci city, and they have provided broad and useful models for studying this affect in different contexts.
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Many scholars working on  lm genres share this fundamental assumption of the medium's affective power, and their work on the philosophy of horror, the power of melodrama to make us cry, or the somatic impact of what Linda Williams calls "body genres" has shown how genres cue particular emotions or engage spectators affectively. 13 In particular, the substantial work on melodrama in  lm and cultural studies since the 1970s, in drawing 14 Yet, despite their contributions to our understanding of the medium's emotional power, these studies tend to elide questions of history. Explorations of cinematic affect, especially cognitivist explorations, are often conducted either in universalizing psychological terms or on formal grounds, generally without considering the historical or cultural situatedness of spectators or individual  lms. Rarely do scholars set out to explain how the politics of emotion in the cinema interface with broader questions about historical representation-both within the cinema and in the cultural contexts of  lm. Conversely, historians have produced a substantial body of writing on  lm, even if it often seems nervous about the implications of the medium for historical scholarship. A  urry of special journal issues, monographs, and anthologies in the 1980s and 1990s brought  lm roundly into the discipline of history. 15 But we are still short of a genuinely interdisciplinary dialogue on the issue. 16 Particularly on questions about the ideologies of historical representation, the historiographical implications of  lm, or cinema's "historical 14 imaginary," 17 historians remain uneasy about the way such approaches appear to prioritize interpretation over data, the writing of history over historical sources, narratives over chronicles, discourse over the archive. Even Robert A. Rosenstone, a historian who has done as much as anyone to advance our knowledge on the relationship between  lm and the idea of history, still harbors reservations about the way  lm scholars approach this issue. If we look to  lm for our history, and to  lm scholars for historiography, Rosenstone fears that we will end up with a "history that cares about how the past means without caring about the things which happened in the past that give rise to the meaning."
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Of course, we cannot make claims on historical meaning without any reference to past events. But neither is it possible to care about things in the past without making assumptions about how they mean. Whether we make them explicit or not, theories of meaning, of ideology, and of culture (including, I suggest, generational cultures of affect) direct our gaze on the past, make our vision alight on certain "things which happened," and lead us to overlook others. Broadly speaking, such claims are now familiar enough from different accounts of the linguistic and visual turns across the humanities and the social sciences. Thinking about history and cinema is merely a way of making those claims more explicit:  lms have the power to direct our gaze quite literally, imbuing versions of the past with the ostensible immediacy of vision and using aesthetic devices such as narrative, costume, editing, and cinematography to bring particular aspects of the past into focus while hiding others. This is where the power of cinematic emotion intersects with broader issues on the relation between  lm and history. For just as writing on cinematic affect tends to short-circuit some of the pressing historiographical issues, so writing on  lm by historians tends to miss the speci c implications of cinema's emotional appeal, let alone the formal dimensions in which that appeal is generated. The crucial question, particularly for explaining the current Geschichtsgefühl in German cinema, is how cinema charges its audiovisual histories with an affective force that can signi cantly shape our understanding of historical events. Ideally, an answer to this question would involve mapping the terms of cinematic affect and the emotional impact of speci c  lms along with a broader history of the emotions; an interdisciplinary approach of this kind would help us better understand  lm's place in a historically speci c "structure of feeling" (Raymond Williams). For the purposes of this essay, I aim merely to exemplify what is at stake in raising this issue of  lm, history, and affect by way of a case study, in which I hope to show how strategic choices about cinematic form in ect not only spectatorial response but ultimately the perception of history itself. Nowhere have the stakes for such an investigation been higher in recent years than in the grandiose claims of one  lm to provide "a new approach to history" by re-creating Hitler's last hours in the bunker. alone any taboos-it did so more through the director's and his overbearing producer's formal decisions than through the subject matter itself. In my discussion of the  lm, I wish to trace the implications of these formal decisions in terms of their affective impact, which I propose to read, in turn, for its broader political implications. What is ultimately at stake in our shifting "feelings" toward (cinematic representations of) Hitler is not only a profound realignment in our general historical coordinates but also an assault on the "culture of affect" linked to 1968.
Der Untergang was marketed from the start under the cachet of authenticity. Both the director, Hirschbiegel, and the producer, Bernd Eichinger, have taken every opportunity to claim that their  lm is "more authentic than any other" and that anything that could not be corroborated was simply not included. 23 Just as often, this stance has been criticized, deconstructed, and ridiculed by historians, film scholars, and critics. Ian Kershaw's glowing endorsement of the  lm notwithstanding, the  lm does little to allay the fundamental questions that Hirschbiegel and Eichinger's promotion raises about their representational politics and their notion of historical accuracy. 24 As critical viewers, we have to contend not only with the necessary  ctionalization involved in transforming historical sources into an audiovisual performance but also with the suspension of disbelief required for taking the bodies of wellknown stars as those of historical  gures. Finally, there is also the representational problem of turning events, historically transmitted actions, and stenographic notes into dialogue for those well-known stars. But as we see the events in the bunker unfold over 156 minutes of screen time, a different aspect of historical  ction comes to the fore: we begin to watch the action with varying degrees of emotional involvement. As history becomes "reconstructed into a stage for feelings," 25 the  lm links historical events and characters, including the suspense built up by a constrained environment, the confusion elicited by the switches from inside to outside, from below to above ground, and our 23. "Wir machen einen großen epischen Film fürs Kino. Allerdings halten wir uns dabei streng an die Dokumente. An Stenogramme der Lagebesprechungen und an die Aufzeichnungen von Zeitzeugen. Was historisch nicht belegt ist, kommt nicht vor. . . . Ich denke, unser Film wird authentischer als alle vorherigen" (We are making a big, epic  lm for the cinema. But we are sticking strictly to the documents: stenographic reports of war conferences and writings by witnesses. Whatever is not historically proven does not appear in the  lm. . . . I think our  lm will be more authentic than all the others that have preceded it) ("Ich halte mich an die Geschichte," interview with Bernd Eichinger, Der Spiegel, April 19, 2003, 153 shifting empathy with different characters. Though I consider the spatial and narrative construction of suspense, as well as the mise-en-scène of confusion and chaos, highly signi cant for the  lm's affective "shape," so to speak, I want to focus here on the question of empathy. For clearly, this particular form of engagement with cinematic characters has broader relevance in the case of a  lm like Der Untergang-especially where it attaches to a character whom we are supposed to take for the "authentic" Führer.
As a relatively classically constructed  lm, Der Untergang solicits an empathetic viewer most notably through the introduction of Traudl Junge at the very beginning of the  lm and through the  gure of Peter Kranz, a young boy who appears lifted out of neorealist classics such as Roberto Rossellini's Germania anno zero (Germany Year Zero, 1948), as he navigates the havoc of Berlin in the spring of 1945. Together with the doctor Schenck, these are among a group of "good and healthy" characters who appear in a "particularly sympathetic" light. 26 The script uses each strategically to draw in the spectator. While much of the narrative is focalized through Traudl, Peter is at the center of a heart-wrenching family melodrama that leads from the blindness of the young Hitler Youth in the Volkssturm to the death of his parents. In terms of the  lm's overall emotional address, it is only  tting that the  nal scene should pair Peter and Traudl as they bike off into the sunset: viewers are eased out of the pandemonium of "the last ten days" through the two  gures who have served as emotional touchstones throughout the narrative. Both young and wide-eyed, a woman and a child among warmongering men, Traudl and Peter are what Vinzenz Hediger calls "avatars of innocent feeling" who anchor the spectator's emotional relationship with the diegesis. 27 The other anchor, of course, is the  gure of the Führer himself, brought to life by the critically acclaimed and broadly naturalistic performance of Bruno Ganz. Emulating Hitler's pathologies down to the smallest detail, Ganz 26. Ibid., 14. Heer details the deliberate "extinguishing of history" that the  lm performs in imbuing these characters with positive traits. To take but one among Heer's many detailed examples: the "good doctor" Schenck, a heroic  gure in the  lm, was in fact a "fanatical Nazi who played a decisive role in Nazi health politics as a doctor, researcher, and professor. His career was boosted by nutritional experiments that he led on a plantation at the Dachau concentration camp and in the laboratory at Mauthausen. More than one hundred of his trial patients are said to have died. In 1940 the SS named him 'nutritional inspector.' When he returned as prisoner of war from the Soviet Union in 1955, the Bavarian Ministry of Culture prohibited him from taking up a post as university professor due to his experiments with humans" (ibid., 16; my translation).
27. Vinzenz Hediger, lecture delivered at the conference "Audiovisuelle Emotionen," Universität Hamburg, December 2006.
creates a screen presence critical to the  lm's claim to authenticity-a claim that Hannes Heer rightly links to its overall sentimentality. 28 Ganz's naturalist approach includes Hitler's well-known speech patterns, his rants as well as his Parkinson's disease. But in addition to the tirades whose patterns-though not their semantics-had been famously satirized in Charlie Chaplin's Great Dictator, Ganz and Hirschbiegel deliberately modulate the performance of the Führer to include notably "softer" moments. 29 Far from merely pacing the  lm's narrative, these moments orchestrate the spectator's emotional relation to the principal character.
Within the  lm's overall construction of Hitler as a character, one such scene stands out with respect to this issue of empathy. That scene begins with Albert Speer's return to the bunker for a farewell visit and a little confessional moment. The dramaturgy of this visit up to Speer's  nal encounter with Hitler himself is worth noting: Speer  rst comes across the Goebbels children at play, then checks in with Magda Goebbels, who is sick in bed;  nally Speer heeds Eva Braun's invitation to see him before he takes leave of the Führer. By aligning a bene cent Speer with the innocence of children, a sick woman, and the incorrigibly naive Braun, the  lm solicits our moral allegiance with Hitler's secretary for armament and war production. Various inserts, close-ups, and pointof-view shots cement the alignment with Speer's empathetic view of the unfolding "tragedy" in the bunker: we see a little doll through his eyes; when Speer picks up one of the Goebbels children, the camera frames this benign paternal gesture in a close two-shot; a close-up of Speer taking Magda Goebbels's hand charges the scene with erotic tension; and a similar close-up of Braun laying her hand on Speer's increases the depth and "intimacy" of the narration leading up to the encounter with Hitler.
When Speer enters Hitler's room after this buildup, we  rst see Hitler from a certain distance, standing with his arms crossed in a static low-angle 28. "The impression of authenticity is reinforced by the sentimentalizing of events. The persons no longer appear as the executors of the project of global conquest or the annihilation of the Jews, or as the representatives of German national chauvinism or a master race; they simply present themselves as humans who have ended up in a situation that allows no escape and who respond to this dilemma according to their character. . . . The actors show feelings, and they elicit feelings in the spectator, who is touched or shocked, feels pity or rejection, but who always takes an emotional interest. This sentimentalization, which is achieved by using all possible cinematic means, produces something that knowledge cannot offer: personal proximity and emotional identi cation" (Heer, Hitler war's, 23; my translation).
29. This again in the name of authenticity; cf. the repeated mention, in interviews and tertiary materials, of an archival tape of Hitler speaking in a "normal" voice to a Finnish delegate-a principal source for Ganz's performance. medium shot, framed internally by a doorway in the immediate foreground. In the ensuing exchange, this camera setup is repeated three times, ultimately framing Speer on his own after Hitler has taken a seat offscreen, as if to prepare the viewer for the separation of the two characters. The bulk of their conversation, however, follows a far more conventional shot breakdown, working with tight singles in a fairly consistent shot-reverse-shot pattern. A seemingly pensive Hitler begins by telling Speer that he "had great plans for the German people" and, in a rare reference of this  lm to the Holocaust, that he "at least fought the Jews openly." He ruminates about the "eternal peace" that follows suicide and, when Speer asks him to spare the German people, notes that "if my own people failed this test, I could not shed a single tear." When Hitler explains that he sees the potential demise of the German people as an incidental casualty brought on by the people themselves, Speer haltingly confesses that he has stopped following Hitler's orders. At this point the editing, which has been favoring reaction shots over shots of the speaker, reframes Hitler in a medium shot that reveals his upper body, turned away from Speer. While his gaze registers no reaction to Speer's "treason," his hands betray the tension as he snaps a pencil without uttering a response. Speer gets up to leave, extends his hand for a  nal farewell, but, when Hitler fails to return the gesture, leaves the room. The camera, however, lingers on Hitler, now framing him again in tight close-up to show a tear trickling down his right cheek ( g. 1). This scene stands out for two reasons:  rst, though it is not the only close-up of Ganz by any stretch, it is certainly the only moment in which we see a tear stain Hitler's face. 30 Second, and more important, this is the only moment in the  lm that shows us Hitler on his own, however brie y. Asking us to focus exclusively on Hitler's emotional state, and highlighting the importance of this moment through acting, cinematography, and shot duration, the  lm offers us what Plantinga calls a "scene of empathy":
The narrative momentarily slows and the interior emotional experience of a favored character becomes the locus of attention. In this kind of scene, which I call the scene of empathy, we see a character's face, typically in closeup, either for a single shot of long duration or as an element of a point-of-view structure alternating between shots of the character's face and shots of what she or he sees. In either case, the prolonged concentration on the character's face is not warranted by the simple communication of information about character emotion. Such scenes are also intended to elicit empathetic emotions in the spectator.
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Plantinga lists a number of criteria that allow us to speak of an effective scene of empathy:  rst, the  lm must focus our attention on the character's facial expression; second, the "duration of the shot (or scene) must be suf cient to allow for the response"; third, the narrative "must lay the proper foundation for empathy to occur" by ensuring that the characters' faces cannot be misread, by providing suf cient information about the character, or by making the situation private and putting the emoting character "in a situation where he or she believes no one is observing"; fourth, different aspects of  lm technique need to work together to produce what Plantinga calls "affective congruence," that is, to give the scene a consistent "feeling tone." 32 All of these criteria are clearly ful lled by the scene just described: we are attentive to Ganz's facial expression; the scene is long enough; at its close, Hitler is shown in a private momentthe only such moment in the  lm-and nothing jars the emotional tone (on the contrary, the muted gestures and voices reinforce it).
It is Plantinga's  fth criterion that raises stickier problems. As Plantinga puts it, "Allegiance to the character whose face is presented in part determines 30 the degree of contagion and empathy." 33 This is the point at which the historical  gure of Hitler, which exists outside the realm of the  ction, is clearly liable to intervene: barring a full- edged neo-Nazi subject position, allegiance to and emotional contagion by Hitler are prima facie unlikely to shape our affective response. Precisely because this is so, we must ask, with some insistence: Why did the  lmmakers strive to bring us into a relation of allegiance with Hitler? Why do all the speci cally cinematic strategies-from shot scale to editing to music-conspire to elicit an empathetic relation with Hitler in this scene, even if we resist that emotion because of extracinematic, social, and historical "conditioning" factors? 34 If Plantinga is right, and scenes of empathy go beyond the task of communicating information about a character and his or her feelings to elicit a response that aligns us emotionally with that character, what is the ideological purpose of such alignment and the allegiance it aims to produce? Why should the viewer be not simply told or shown that Hitler felt betrayed but actually asked to feel that the Füh-rer felt betrayed by Speer at the very end? 35 Before I explore some answers to these questions, it is important to recognize that, while the scene with Speer may be the only one to qualify as a "scene of empathy" in Plantinga's strict sense, the strategic choices that underpin that scene are systematic and determine the portrayal of Hitler in various other ways as well. A comparison with Pabst's 1955 version of the  lm, which also depicts Hitler alone but undercuts the construction of "affective congruence" through its expressionist approach to lighting, performance, and mise-en-scène, would be instructive. 36 In addition, careful analysis of the  lm's dramaturgy-in particular as it relates to Hitler and his secretary-reveals a systematic attention to viewers' emotional investment in putatively "likable" and "unlikable" characters alike. I would like to illustrate Der Untergang's systematic investment in empathy by turning brie y to the  lm's beginning and looking at how the opening sequence engages its spectator. 36. Der letzte Akt features a direct parallel to what I am describing here as the "scene of empathy," but Pabst undercuts the "emotional tone" of that scene by using voice-over and heavily "presentational" acting, in addition to expressionist lighting throughout.
Hitler, the  lm's male lead, is not introduced right away. Instead, we meet other characters who serve as gateways to the narrative world and thus prepare us for our  rst encounter with the protagonist. After a brief clip from Im toten Winkel: Hitlers Sekretärin (Blind Spot: Hitler's Secretary, 2002), André Heller's documentary about Hitler's secretary, the  rst images show a group of  ve women who, like the spectator, try to get their bearings in a night setting. Through close-ups and point-of-view shots, the  lm singles out one of them, who will play a crucial role in the  lm's overall "structure of sympathy."
37 During the  rst few minutes we recognize her as the  ctionalized reincarnation of Hitler's secretary, Traudl Junge, seen in the documentary prologue preceding the credits. But as the mode switches from documentary to  ction, the function of that character shifts as well. Whereas the opening clip from the conversation with Traudl generated a historical, distanced, re exive take on the Nazi past, the as-yet-unmarried young Traudl Humps, played by Alexandra Maria Lara, places us in media res. Far from re exive, her point of view is uncertain and unstable-an impression reinforced by the leers of two male soldiers in a brief close-up. Only after we have begun to familiarize ourselves with the opening location of the  lm through Traudl's eyes do we join her and the four other women in their nervous anticipation of Hitler-or rather, of Ganz playing Hitler: all  ve women, seated on a bench at the right side of the frame, lean forward toward the middle of the image, where, after a cut to an empty doorway, Hitler emerges from his of ce.
Of course, the encounter with Hitler in this  lm was prepared metatextually. Whether in Germany or abroad, both the  lm in general and Ganz's performance of Hitler in particular had been prepositioned discursively through reviews, interviews, and advance publicity. Like the historical Hitler, this predisposition affects emotional engagement with the  lm later on-raising the same questions I raised above. For now, however, I am interested simply in the formal construction of this opening sequence and its role in the phenomenology of character construction. For as Ganz rightly points out in an interview, "Selbst wenn so viel Geschichte im Spiel ist, geht es doch auch darum, dass es emotional dicht, differenziert und lebendig gespielt ist. . . . Maßgabe ist erst einmal das Drehbuch" (Even if this much history is involved, it is also important to act in an emotionally coherent, differentiated, and lively way. . . . What counts to begin with is the script). 38 In other words, even an overdetermined  ction such as the one constructed in Der Untergang tends to work according to cinematic conventions of character construction, suspense, and even genre. How, then, is the historical  gure Hitler introduced as a  lm character?
When we review the  lm's opening with this question in mind, two aspects stand out:  rst, the spectator's curiosity is aroused through classic suspense built around a series of delays, or retardations; second, through character construction, editing, and narration, the  lm generates intimacy designed to draw in the spectator. As Wim Wenders points out, this is a cinematic construct be tting any number of "classic" beginnings. Wenders, who (much to his credit) has entered into a lasting feud with Fest, provides a good description of the  lm's opening: "Die Kandidatinnen kommen bei Nacht und Nebel an, klar, es ist Krieg, sitzen dann in einer Reihe im Warteraum und sind aufgeregt. Alle schauen sie schließlich auf die sich öffnende Tür (und wir im Publikum mit ihnen), und dann tritt, höchst kinowirksam aufgebaut, Hitler auf. Da ist er!" (The candidates arrive in night and fog-well obviously, there's a war on-and then they sit next to each other in a waiting room and are nervous. Finally, they look at the opening door [as do we in the audience], and then, with carefully calculated cinematic effect, Hitler appears. There he is!). 39 Aside from referencing the classic, or kinowirksam, buildup of the main character, Wenders's description is relevant because of his eye for the audience. When the  ve women lean forward, "und wir im Publikum mit ihnen," the editing and the acting both work toward an emotional engagement known as "mimicry." This engagement can take the simple form of a motor re ex that makes me lean forward when the women do, but it can also involve so-called affective mimicry, in which I share the characters' emotional tension (possibly by way of re exively emulating the physical act of leaning forward and evaluating or adopting it as an expression of emotional tension). But whatever my level and form of engagement with the characters, it is not simply a matter of "identifying" with Traudl, as Wenders claims. In his empathetic take on the  lm's opening sequence, Wenders suggests that when the other four women rejoice with Traudl and embrace her at the end of that sequence, so does the spectator: "Der [Kinobesucher] hat sich gerade, ob er will oder nicht, mit der netten und liebenswerten Traudl identi ziert. Und wird das die nächsten zwei Stunden über so tun" (Whether he wants to or not, the cinemagoer has just identi ed with nice and lovable Traudl. And will continue to do so for the next two hours). 41 We should object to this description  rst because we are unlikely to embrace anybody in the movie theater when Traudl gets the job with Hitler. More to the point, we need to question Wenders's notion of identi cation, which he extends willy-nilly to the  lm's entire duration. Murray Smith has provided an eminently useful model by which to revise this familiar but imprecise notion of identi cation, a model that allows us to differentiate and substantiate Wenders's otherwise justi ed doubts about the narrative stance of Hirschbiegel's  lm. Exploring the various spectatorial dispositions lumped together in the more familiar notion of identi cation, Smith delineates a complex "structure of sympathy" to account for the different forms in which we engage with  ctional characters.
42 Following Smith, we should begin, for instance, by differentiating between alignment and allegiance-that is, between the way a  lm aligns me, the viewer, with a given character, on the one hand, and the way it solicits my allegiance for that character, on the other. Provided that I recognize the  gures on-screen as  lmic characters in the  rst place, the question is, which of these characters are particularly suited to enable my access to the narrative world, to the settings and events that belong to the story? Here, the young, wide-eyed Traudl undoubtedly plays an important role: small signs draw the viewer's empathy toward her, including her worried face when she passes the barrier to Hitler's compound, her startled re ex when she almost trips on the way to the bunker, and her gesture of anticipation when she leans forward with the other women from Berlin after they have been announced to the Führer ( g. 2) .
Shot in close-up, each small gesture invites the viewer's affective mimicry and provides an emotional cue for engaging with the narrative. If the notion of identi cation glosses over the  ner points of this opening sequence, we can nonetheless specify some key aspects of the emerging relationship between character and viewer: to gain our bearings in the  ctional (i.e., historical) world 41. Wenders, "Tja, dann wollen wir mal." 42. Smith, Engaging Characters, 74-109. of the  lm, we follow Traudl's lead, reading her somatic and physiognomic reactions. Hardly identifying with her in the sense of imagining ourselves in her shoes, we do recognize her anxiety, and we re ect on possible reasons and solutions for it. This alignment, which is at once cognitive and emotional, is reinforced by the so-called primacy effect, which causes us to give the  rst character we encounter the bene t of the doubt and to follow her (emotional) lead more readily than that of all characters introduced later. If we add to this the documentary frame that already introduced us to Traudl in an interview situation, then we have every reason to expect that the early alignment will lead to a far-reaching form of allegiance, which, on one level, is precisely what Wenders means by identi cation.
But what does the  lm do with this double investment of alignment and allegiance once Hitler appears after the appropriate kinowirksam buildup? Having stoked Traudl's anxiety and our curiosity, the  lm produces Hitler in a deliberately staged dramaturgy of intimacy. After he has been announced, we see the Führer almost exclusively in close-ups or medium close-ups that emphasize Ganz's facial expressions. We encounter a quiet, thoughtful, and affable man whose mild manner Ganz portrays with a voice to match and a sparkle in his eye. But more than the acting, it is arguably the editing that solicits our emotional investment here. The shot breakdown of the scene integrates Hitler into the  ow of images by beginning to construct formal parallels between the dictator and the young secretary. The shot-reverse-shot breakdown of Hitler's  rst conversation with Traudl not only works with identical shot distances (as is to be expected) but also emphasizes how the characters' gestures mirror and complement each other in a relationship of proximity, mimicry, and intimacy ( g. 3).
When Traudl fails in her  rst attempt at the typewriter a few moments later, the  lm not only places the two characters next to each other but provides a shared point-of-view shot of Traudl's garbled typing ( g. 4). Narratively, these four shots seal the deal between Hitler and his newly hired secretary, but pragmatically, they seal the opening of the  lm, which has led us from an alignment with Traudl to a double alignment with her and Hitler, in whose mutual gaze we now participate. And just as Hitler has been able to allay Traudl's fears, the  lm asks us to lay aside our worst fears about a Hitler movie by inviting us to align ourselves with the benign  gure of the fallible employer. The intimacy of the setting and among the characters provides a model for the viewer's moral orientation toward the male lead. In terms of the formal construction of the  lm's opening, Hitler ends up far more emotionally "legible" and thus less threatening, for example, than the two soldiers who grin and stare at the women in a relatively unmotivated earlier shot outside the bunker. had its roots at least partly in their refusal to own up to their collective emotional investment in the  gure of the Führer and to their grief at the loss of this  gure, then producing such investment through  lm could be read as the ex post facto therapeutic gesture that this analysis called for.
In the abbreviated version sketched here, however, such a reading clearly overreaches in its speculative character-both for reasons already inherent in the Mitscherlichs' analysis (their often-criticized reliance on notions of a collective soul, now pushed to an even further remove as the generation of perpetrators and bystanders begins to be replaced on the historical stage) and because it overvalues the  lm itself, which remains deeply  awed on many levels. What I aim to suggest by bringing up the discursive logics of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, rather, is the need for returning from the minutiae of formal analysis to the larger discursive context of this  lm. As Kershaw's comments on our shifting perspective on the Third Reich already suggest, however, the speci c emotional charge carried by this or any  lm is in need of historicization itself. If Der Untergang can, and indeed should, be counted among the contemporary wave of "nostalgia  lms," we must aim to understand the affective charge of this wave within a broader cultural history of emotion in postwar Germany. In terms of the analysis offered above, this also implies that we need to broaden our view of cinematic affect to include not only textual or cognitive processes but also more broadly historical, ideological ones. Murray Smith gestures to this broadening of our interpretive framework when he argues that his model of character engagement might "facilitate rather than con ict with a historical approach."
46 For this purpose, Smith's notion of the co-text is extremely important. Smith uses this notion as a conceptual mediator between a wholly antimimetic structuralism (where everything, including questions of morality, is internal to the text) and an overly mimetic stance that would translate everyday values into the act of reception without making adjustments for textuality, dramaturgy, character construction, or cinematic style-in other words, for precisely the elements that I have sought to foreground in my analysis. By contrast, "the co-text is the set of values, beliefs, and so forth which form the backdrop to the events of the narrativethe context within the text, as it were." Our various ways of engaging with  ctional characters, and these characters themselves, Smith points out, "only have a determinate moral valence within the terms of the text's 'co-text.'" In the case of a mainstream, popular  lm about Hitler, that co-text is at once self-evident and diffuse: it involves generic assumptions about narration, suspense, and melodrama, as well as broadly discursive frames such as the ongoing debates about history and memory in Germany; these, in turn, involve generational patterns that have direct bearing on a  lm scripted by Fest (b. 1926), produced by Eichinger (b. 1949), and directed by a comparatively young Hirschbiegel (b. 1957). What unites these representatives of three generations is their disinterest, if not outright disdain, for the generation only "numerically" represented by Eichinger in the making of the  lmthe so-called generation of 1968, which  rst took up the Mitscherlichs' analysis as the basis for its cultural productions and other political interventions. Clearly, this is a structuring absence in the production context of Der Untergang, and to place the  lm discursively would mean to reconstruct a generational narrative about history, memory, and emotions in postwar Germany. For as Knoch and Weigel, among others, have argued, generations de ne themselves, among other things, through shared emotional  ashpoints-which are often (audio)visually coded as images that provide "generational containers of feeling [generationelle Gefühlscontainer]." 48 While this terrain has arguably been charted less comprehensively than the theory of empathy more broadly speaking, we might usefully gain our bearings here by harking back to an earlier moment of national empathy in the 1980s. I am referring to the television broadcast of Holocaust, which captivated the nation and moved the massive TV audience as few attempts at treating the history of Nazism had done before. Though we should be mindful of the methodological pitfalls of juxtaposing audience response to the soapoperatic treatment of Jewish victims of the Holocaust, on the one hand, with the similarly melodramatic mise-en-scène of the central locus of Nazi power in its  nal days, on the other, there is something to be learned from revisiting the emotional watershed of that earlier moment. Writing on the heels of the heated debates about the  lm, Andreas Huyssen argues forcefully for taking seriously the aesthetic and political implications of the miniseries form. The key problem with critical appraisals of Holocaust, for Huyssen, lies in their "common assumption that a cognitive rational understanding of German antiSemitism under National Socialism is per se incompatible with an emotional 48. Habbo Knoch, "Gefühlte Gemeinschaften: Bild und Generation in der Moderne," in Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs, ed. Ulrike Jureit and Michael Wildt (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 300-301. Cf. also Weigel, "Die 'Generation' als symbolische Form." melo dramatic representation of history as the story of a family. Left German critiques of Holocaust betray a fear of emotions and subjectivity which itself has to be understood historically as in part a legacy of the Third Reich." 49 Huyssen, in other words, interprets the empathetic response of German viewers to the melodramatic portrayal of Jewish suffering as a watershed in postwar historical consciousness, pointing to "broader aesthetic and political problems which we are only now beginning to explore." 50 Those problems have resurfaced in the new German discourse on feeling, but the emotional landscape has shifted radically. With empathy now attaching to victimized German protagonists, let alone to Hitler himself, we will have to reevaluate the function of emotions and subjectivity once more. For that reevaluation, Huyssen's reading of Holocaust remains useful as a reminder of the potentially productive value of empathy as a complement to rational, theoretical, or scholarly discourse.
But this recognition does not excuse us from evaluating carefully the politics of emotion or of the current Geschichtsgefühl in Germany. One distinction that immediately stands out as we compare reactions from the 1980s to the affective logics of Der Untergang relates to the generational question raised above: if Huyssen's analysis of the response to Holocaust ultimately aimed to reconcile the rationalizations of cultural productions of the 1960s (however de cient they may appear in Huyssen's revisionist critique) with the emotional investments unleashed by Holocaust, Der Untergang gains its purchase only through violently rejecting the 1960s-witness the symptomatically enraged tone of Eichinger's comments that the "so-called 68ers" were a bunch of "liars" who did nothing but generate "political phraseology." 51 But witness also the iconoclastic attitude that preceded the production and accompanied the discourses through which it was promoted, that is, the claim that here was an unprecedented look at the history of National Socialism and that Germans were  nally taking into their own hands a history that had been expropriated until today. A second note of caution attaches to the function of emotion as a totalizing response-whether to a particular  lm or miniseries or to historical material in general. This is exactly what Walser vindicates in privileging "feeling" (Gefühl, Emp ndung) over "knowledge" (Erkenntnis) in the way that he relates to (his) nation: emotional investment may always involve cognition, but it is synthetic, not analytic; in other words, to charge a nation, a  lm, or a historical moment emotionally means to subsume its various aspects, and even its contradictions, under the totalizing grasp of an affective responsewhether that response is sorrow, empathy, pity, guilt, or anything else. While Huyssen is right to emphasize that cultural texts can be productive precisely through their emotional appeal, the actual function of the latter remains to be analyzed. Where that appeal bathes the atrocities of historical perpetrators in the revisionist light of compassion, it is fundamentally misplaced.
With these caveats in mind, let me return one last time to the place of Der Untergang at the intersection of  lm and history. Ultimately, the  lm's investment in empathy has to do with the text's pragmatics, addressing viewers who expect Hitler the monster. In this sense, the opening can be said to acknowledge the existence of Hitler, if not as a historical person, then at least as a popular or media  gure whose genealogy we would have to trace back to both Chaplin and Leni Riefenstahl. But overall, the  lm also works hard to make us forget this distinction, both through suspense and through the  lm's alleged accuracy. Consequently, this is where analysis must begin: to account for the  lm's structure of sympathy, we have to map the tension between formal cinematic choices and various forms of popular, textual historical knowledge, or between the "elicitors" of emotions and their extracinematic, metatextual "conditioners," to reappropriate Plantinga's terminology. To maintain this tension means to insist on the  lmic construction of Hitler as a cinematic character. In this respect, talk of the "humanization" of Hitler in Hirschbiegel's  lm is entirely misleading-after all, we are watching not a human but a screen character portrayed by a human actor embodying a historical  gure. A  lm such as Hirschbiegel's biopic involves at least two Hitlers, if not more: as JeanLuc Comolli suggests with regard to historical  ctions more generally, there is potentially a "body too much"-that of the historical Hitler and that of the actor who, in a "naturalist" aesthetic, tends to hide behind the former. 52 For the purpose of analysis, however, we need to produce both-the mediated and the historical body. This is emphatically different from claiming that the historical Hitler overwhelms the textual Hitler or from trying to ascertain the historical accuracy of the cinematic representation. Michael Wildt describes Der Untergang intriguingly as a "historian's trap": it asks us to investigate its relationship to history, yet it is a "historical"  lm merely to the degree that Mutiny on the Bounty is a historical  lm. 53 Der Untergang uses generic cinematic idioms to tell a suspenseful story that happens to have a historical referent. To analyze only its representation of history is to miss its generic and emotional appeal; to analyze merely its generic appeal would be to willfully disregard the fact that the  lm is saturated with historical reference: damned if you do, damned if you don't. Rather than resolve this impasse, I want to argue for locating our emotional engagement precisely in the constitutive tension between text and context, between a  lm with formal properties of character construction and spectator engagement, on the one hand, and the historical reference points-both in the Third Reich and in the Geschichtsgefühl of contemporary Germany-on the other. The new "nostalgia  lm" would seem to necessitate this dual perspective with special force, particularly where an understanding and evaluation of their "structure of engagement" is at stake. Only if we locate emotions at the crossroads of cinema's aesthetic devices and of historical knowledge can we begin to talk in any meaningful way of Geschichtsgefühl, or a feeling for history. 
